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Abstract 
Both autonomy and agency play central roles in the emerging enactive vocab-
ulary. Although some treat these concepts as practically synonymous, others 
have sought to be more explicit about the conditions required for agency over 
and above autonomy. I attempt to be self-conscious about the role of the ob-
server (or scientist) in such discussions, and emphasise that the concept of 
agency, in particular, is deeply entwined with the nature of the observer and 
the framing of the observation. This is probably well known to enactivists, but 
runs the risk of being badly misunderstood if it is not made explicit. A height-
ened awareness of the role of the observer in the attribution of agency may 
allow us to make advances in questions in which progress is hindered by as-
suming a single split between subject and object. I argue that human experi-
ence is characterized by our embedding in webs of meaning arising from our 
participation in systems of many sorts, and that this richness demands a cor-
responding lightness of touch with respect to the identification of agentive 
subjects. 
Keywords: agency; autonomy; enactivism; cognition; mind. 
1. Introduction 
The treatment of agency in human intercourse is a matter of the highest im-
portance. It underpins the enlightenment notion of human rights. It informs, 
or should inform, the manner in which society apportions responsibility for 
actions, including those boundaries that delimit the criminal and the insane. 
The attribution of agency is one of the principal themes that informs and de-
fines all religious traditions. When the enactive and mind-and-life schools 
choose to make agency a foundational concept, they must do so with a sense 
of gravitas, for the issues at stake go beyond novelty in the cognitive and be-
havioral sciences or philosophy of mind. In what follows, I will consider the 
entanglement of the twin concepts of autonomy and agency as they feature in 
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the enactive literature. At stake is whether these terms pick out distinct con-
cepts, and more importantly, whether agency can and should be naturalised, 
and what that would mean. 
I begin by acknowledging the consequences of a constructivist approach for 
the practice of science, which demands that we recognize the social and his-
torical context in which the attribition of agency has been restricted to a sin-
gle kind of split between agentive subject and associated world. Some careful 
attempts to characterize agency over and above autonomy are discussed in 
detail, leading to the cautious stance that an overly rigid attribution of agency 
to this or that system may blind us to the important distinction between the 
domain of the system and the domain of the description of the system. This 
caution allows us to recognize the plurality of systems among which our lives 
unfold, that provide many and varied examples of systems that may appear 
agentive. The hope is that this caution will allow us to recognize that in attrib-
uting agency here, or there, we are at the same time identifying our own being 
with diverse forms of systematic organisation and hence with diverse systems 
of values that thereby arise. 
The enactive agenda necessarily has one foot in scientific practice and anoth-
er in the philosophy of science (there may be more than 2 legs). As Stewart 
noted “the paradigm of enaction is ontologically nonobjectivist—or to put it 
more positively, radically constructivist” (Stewart et al. 2010). Constructivist 
agendas have not found easy integration into mainstream scientific practice, 
and indeed many, perhaps most, areas of scientific inquiry get by just fine 
with the presumption that they are uncovering the structures and form of 
a mind-independent world. For those of a constructivist bent, this is, of course, 
no longer tenable for “sciences of the mind”, or, by extension, for any of the 
Human Sciences.  
A necessary consequence of adopting a constructivist perspective is that ex-
planation is necessarily bounded. In the spirit of pragmatic explanation 
broadly construed, the practice of explanation, description and modeling is 
not to fix this or that phenomenon within a single static account of the world, 
but to develop an understanding that is appropriate to a specific domain, and 
that may serve in a broader array of accounts, some more specific, some more 
general, but none aspiring to be ground truth. The pragmatic boundedness of 
explanation here is neither the logical kind espoused by Pierce (Murphy and 
Rorty 1990) nor the unbridled catagorical cornucopia of Ryle (Ryle 1949), but 
demands that explanation be couched in terms appropriate to specific do-
mains. The biological concept of autopoeisis identifies a particularly im-
portant form of autonomy that is defined with respect to the chemical domain 
(Maturana and Varela 1991). A more general concept of autonomy, in Varela’s 
definition, requires inter alia that the processes that characterize an autono-
mous system be a unity “recognizable in the space (domain) in which the pro-
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cesses exist” (Varela 1979: 55). In an informative example, Varela suggests that 
“the accidental collision of two running animals, as a bodily encounter of liv-
ing systems, is not a biological phenomenon (even though it may have biologi-
cal consequences), but the bodily contact of two animals in courtship is.” 
(Varela 1979: 42). 
Most scientific practice is not done within a constructivist framework, and an 
appreciation of the limited nature of explanation, of the finiteness of domains 
of discourse, is not something that can be taken for granted among scientists 
generally, and still less so in the conversation between science and society 
more generally, where science is still almost universally regarded as the 
source of certainty, and the ultimate arbiter of disputes. As the enactive agen-
da develops, and seeks to provide a set of concepts applicable in domains from 
the biochemical to the social, it must exercise caution if it is not to be enthusi-
astically misunderstood as a means of establishing certainty with respect to 
many vexed notions that it takes as central. Among these are the twin terms of 
autonomy and agency. This is a first challenge we face. 
In its principled rejection of the Cartesian split of things into {inner, mental, 
and subjective}, versus {outer, material, and objective} realities, enactive the-
ory finds itself in the lexically challenged business of talking about human 
experience and behavior without being able to lean confidently upon any psy-
chological predicates whatsoever. Yet we cannot do without these. To address 
this, it is necessary to recognize a second consequence of a radical constructiv-
ist approach to understanding: As we learn about phenomena in various do-
mains, so too we are learning about that which we are.  
Maxim: Along with asking “what is this thing that we see”, we need to ask 
“what are we that we should see such? ”.  
A corrolary of this is that our understanding of all psychological predicates 
should be taken as tentative, and subject to change. 
The emphasis in that maxim is on the “we". The sociocultural background in 
which scientific practice has developed has the striking characteristic of at-
tributing agency in human affairs exclusively to the individual person, con-
ceived of as a discrete organic unit. Democratic societies that emerged after 
the Age of Revolutions are founded upon the notion of individual agency. The 
prevalent Christian theology, and post-Reformation Protestant ideology posi-
tion the concepts of culpability and responsibility squarely within the individ-
ual. It is against this backdrop that the science and practice of psychology 
emerged in the latter half of the Nineteenth Century, and the unit of psycholo-
gy, even social psychology, is the individual person, conceived of as a singular 
mind housed within a singular body. 
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The emerging enactivist position has the potential to move our discourse be-
yond the limitations of Protestant theology and 19th Century psychology. The 
language that is emerging, and being carefully tended and curated, allows 
explanation to countenance multiple perspectives, even mutually incompati-
ble perspectives. In its parallel treatment of system-internal and system-
external perspectives, it allows for a richer, plural, understanding of the in-
teractions among complex systems such as cells, persons, or social groups, and 
a recognition of disparate value sets that influence their evolution and inter-
action. But a positivist view of scientific understanding and a restriction of 
agency to single human individuals are both deeply entrenched in our ambi-
ent belief systems and practices. Careful exegesis of the conceptual fulcrums 
of the enactive approach is indispensable, and the treatment of agency in par-
ticular will be of singular importance. It would be unwise to be dogmatic here. 
 
2. Pinning Agency to the Wall 
Autonomy and agency are absolutely central to the enactive approach.39 The 
somewhat vague notion of autonomy was given a more precise definition by 
Varela as “organizational closure" (Varela 1979: 58). On this view, autonomous 
organization is characterized by circular closure among a suite of processes 
that collectively constitute a persistent dynamic identity that engages in regu-
lated exchanges with its surround. The most discussed example, by a substan-
tial margin, is the caricature of a single bacterium ascending a chemical gra-
dient through chemotaxis. This example, trotted out repeatedly with differing 
degrees of attention to biochemical detail, serves as the exemplary embodi-
ment of the autonomous and agentive system. As an illustrative case, it allows 
discussion of value, as the nutrient is unambiguously a “good thing” from the 
point of view of the bacterium itself. It allows discussion of sense-making by 
linking the effective coping of the bacterium in a variable environment with 
its own metabolic requirements. It illustrates the contrast between a perspec-
tive anchored to a specific system, and a view from nowhere. In short, the 
chemotactic bacterium serves as the central myth of the enactive approach, in 
the sense of a narrative that serves to structure many discussions that need to 
be had as we apply systems thinking to our own selves. 
But real bacteria are vastly different, more complex, more tightly embedded 
in their environments, and more social than this. The bacterium of this oft-
repeated illustration is described as a minimal mechanism, requiring a single 
sensor capable of detecting ambient glucose concentration, a means of loco-
motion with a directed mode and an undirected mode, and a probabilistic link 
between the slope of the ambient gradient and the likelihood of switching 
                                                             
39 I do not make any strong distinction between enactive theory and mind and life positions with-
in philosophy. Both terms cover a range of positions, with very substantial overlap. 
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between the two modes. Viewed as a mechanism, it is indistinguishable from 
any machine concocted by a designer, and indeed, as a character in our narra-
tive, it could be argued that it has indeed been designed. There is nothing to 
be found in the mechanism that warrants the attribution of agency. That at-
tribution comes instead from our understanding, as scientists, that chemotac-
tic locomotion can be understood as serving the continued existence of the cell 
as an organisationally closed set of processes. A functional description, by us 
as scientists, is predicated upon our passing adoption of the perspective of the 
bacterium, which is the domain for whom the ambient glucose is meaningful, 
thereby licensing talk of “function”. 
In discussion of the caricature of the bacterium, two related issues seem to 
become entangled. One issue concerns the difficult task of differentiating be-
tween machines that are designed, and machines that have evolved. The sec-
ond lies in distinguishing between “merely” autonomous phenomena such as 
tornados and flames on the one hand and apparently agentive (and autono-
mous) cells on the other. With respect to the first distinction among machines, 
there is no overt marker of the locus of the designer, or the origin of the or-
ganising principle that characterises the machine. Thus that distinction is 
made on the basis of our knowledge of the history of the machine. With re-
spect to the second, there is much discussion that remains to be had, but the 
issues at stake are importantly different.  
An informative example of the confusion of the concepts of autonomy and 
agency is provided by two related papers. In Rohde and Stewart (2008), it is 
argued that autonomy is a complex property, similar in some respects to such 
complex notions as intentionality or intelligence. When faced with a system 
(natural or artificial), the ascription of autonomy thereto can not be based on 
a set of necessary or sufficient conditions. But the authors are not happy with 
the “as if” ascription that falls out of adopting what Dennett has called the 
“intentional stance” with respect to the system (Dennett 1989). Taking a con-
structivist perspective, the authors seek to improve on mere ascription 
through appeal to generative mechanisms that can give rise to the phenome-
non of autonomy. Taking a cue from that suggestion, then, Barandiaran et 
al. (2009) attempt to define the concept of agency, first through mere descrip-
tion, and then improving and deepening that characterization through the 
proposal of a set of generative mechanisms that can give rise to agency. The 
switch from a generative description of autonomy to a generative description 
of agency provides a telling example of the manner in which these two con-
cepts have become entangled. Note that the explanatory move common to 
both these papers is independent of the distinction I am drawing here. Both 
papers seek to ground an account of a complex phenomenon in something 
more than mere description, and both do so by appealing to generative mech-
anisms. Whether this succeeds or not is not at issue here. What is at issue is 
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whether autonomy and agency are separate dissociable concepts. Let us look 
at some examples from the recent literature: 
Moreno and Etxeberria (2005) contrast the “actions" performed by a stone in 
a river that keeps water from flowing, and by bacteria in milk that ferment it. 
Only the latter, they say, can lay claim to agentive goings on, and they ground 
this claim in the role of the fermentation from the perspective of the bacte-
rium. This contrast seems particularly clear, but mainly because the rock is 
not “doing" anything. Absent activity on the part of the agent, agency is invisi-
ble. Barandiaran et al. (2009) consider a suite of more interesting and chal-
lenging contrasts that provide guidance in the application of three criteria: 
Individuality (is the system an individual in the above sense?), Interactional 
Asymmetry (is the system the active source of interaction with its environ-
ment?), and Normativity (is the norm that shapes the interaction generated by 
the system itself?). Simultaneous satisfaction of these three conditions serve to 
pick out the chemotactically locomoting cell as the only instance of full agen-
cy, while several other carefully chosen candidates fail to tick at least one of 
the three boxes. Individuality corresponds roughly to the definition of auton-
omy as organisational closure, as discussed above. Both cells and tornados 
might reasonably meet the criterion of systemic individuality. We therefore 
need to consider whether the other two conditions succeed in going beyond 
autonomy and to pick out agency as a distinct and definite concept. 
The requirement of normativity refers to the interpretation of a behaviour as 
subserving goals, and Barandiaran et al. (2009) wish to restrict the attribution 
of agency to systems which generate their own goals. Many authors have rec-
ognized that agentive behaviour occurs in the service of goals, indeed its goal 
directed nature may be the very feature that allows a continuous stream of 
movement to be parsed by an observer into discrete behaviours for considera-
tion in the first place. Some have opined that goals alone are sufficient for 
agency (Beer 1995), but most researchers, especially those who seek to distin-
guish the agency of the living from the functional carry-on of devices and ro-
bots, have insisted that agency requires that the goals arise from the needs 
and identity of the system itself (Weber and Varela 2002; Maes 1993; Christen-
sen and Hooker 2000; Kauffman 2002; Deacon 2011, and others). Upon this 
rock, many have foundered, even Immanuel Kant himself, for whom the in-
trinsic purposes of the living posed an insurmountable challenge within 
a Newtonian metaphysical view. Unlike Kant, we have available to us a richer 
metaphysical armoury and the powerful set of concepts that stem from the 
description and study of complex systems (Weber and Varela 2002). However, 
even with this endowment, there is not available to us any litmus-test for dis-
tinguishing between intrinsically generated and extrinsically imposed goals in 
the shaping of behaviour.  
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A first example adduced by Barandiaran et al. (2002) meets the criterion of 
intrinsic normativity, but is still regarded as non-agentive. Consider a mother 
cat and several kittens. One of the kittens is moved by the mother closer to her 
body to keep it warm. The kitten meets the criterion of dynamic identity, and 
it also satisfies the intrinsic normativity criterion because “the system-
environment coupling is satisfying the norm of keeping the kitten’s tempera-
ture within viability boundaries" (Barandiaran et al. 2009: 5). Agency is lack-
ing, the authors contend, because the movement has its origin in the mother—
a separate system that forms part of the kitten’s environment. This example is 
threatened by the simple expedient of re-bracketing the system under obser-
vation: if the system is the family of cats, the source of the action now lies 
within the bounds of the system, the identity and normativity conditions are 
met, and it seems that the act is now agentive in the strong sense the authors 
seek. I do not wish to argue that the authors are correct or incorrect in the 
attribution of agency. I wish to point out that the coherence of the notion de-
pends upon the framing of the observation. To the extent that the family can 
be considered a system with its own dynamic identity, it is available as a pos-
sible locus of agency40. One of the core insights of the enactive approach is 
that autonomous organization is not fixed at one level. In mutual interaction, 
pluralities of autonomous systems can form novel superordinate emergent 
domains that themselves exhibit autonomy. With autonomy arises the need to 
consider the perspective of the emergent autonomous system, and the phe-
nomenology enacted thereby. This general approach can be taken in consider-
ing interactions among cells, producing multicellular phenomena, including 
multicellular organisms. It can be applied to the emergence of social phenom-
ena, e.g. riots or Mexican waves, when people engage in rich, reciprocal inter-
action with each other and within the confines of just the right set of con-
straints. And it can be applied to a mother cat and her kittens as a whole. 
Related objections arise in the case of Parkinsonian tremors. Here, it is 
claimed, the human body is the system to be considered, the system is the ac-
tive source of the interaction, but the normativity condition is not met as the 
tremor does not serve to maintain, protect, or establish any internally gener-
ated norm. Elsewhere, the argument is made that “the spasms of a person 
from Parkinson’s disease are not considered to be the [sic] actions, even 
though the person is a well-identifiable entity and the genuine source of her 
interactions with the environment” (Barandiaran et al. 2009: 5). The system 
has been variously identified here as the body, and the person. Neither seems 
entirely appropriate. Tremor arises when the equilibrium dynamics of a so-
matic subsystem changes from a static equilibrium to an oscillatory regime. 
                                                             
40 Perhaps the mother + kittens is a poor candidate for the ascription of autonomy in the first 
place. In that case, my argument in this instance is weakened, but the general observations about 
the role of the framing of the system remains. 
AVANT  Vol. V, No. 2/2014 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
 
105 
 
The fact that an oscillatory dynamic arises at all is evidence that there is in-
deed a system underlying the phenomenon, but it is not the whole body. The 
persistent copulatory motions of a male preying mantis after decapitation 
illustrates the notion of an oscillatory regime in a system that is less than 
a whole body rather well.41 The assignation of the tremor to the body is thus 
misplaced, but the confusion of the body and the person is a far more serious 
matter, to which we will return in the next section. 
The final example adduced by Barandiaran et al. (2002) is that of passive os-
mosis at the boundary of the cell. Here, the system seems to be uncontrover-
sially the cell, and if the osmotic process subserves metabolism, the normativi-
ty condition is met. Agency, it is claimed, is not present because the system 
(the cell) is not the “active” source of the interaction. This example seems to 
typify a deep linguistic problem when discussing agency. Many verbs of ac-
tion implicitly lean upon the background notion of an actor. Thus if we say 
that a property p of a system s is modulated, it is hard to make sense of that 
statement unless there is an implied agent, the modulator, who is doing the 
modulation. The asymmetry condition employed in the definition of agency in 
Barandiaran et al. (2009) seems to become circular for this reason when 
they say: 
We therefore define interactional asymmetry as the condition describing 
a system as capable of engaging in some modulations of the coupling [between 
system and environment] and doing so at certain times. (Barandiaran et 
al. 2009: 4)  
If a system “engages in some modulations", we might well view it as an agent, 
but the presumption of agency lies here in the very description that employs 
an agentive verb. Such circularity infests the literature on agency. Kauffman 
(2002: 49) defines an agent as a system doing something on its own behalf. The 
verb “doing” carries the implication of a do-er, and circularity threat-
ens again. 
 
3. The Eye of the Beholder 
Both asymmetry and normativity, it seems, depend upon the framing of the 
phenomena by an observer. In this, they have a lot in common with the indi-
viduality criterion itself. As Rohde and Stewart noted, taking the status of the 
observer seriously “transforms our conceptual world in a way that blurs the 
boundaries of what we normally consider a belief and what we consider 
a fact” (Rohde and Stewart 2008: 425). This groundlessness that necessarily 
arises when one eschews a positivist commitment presents something of 
                                                             
41 If truth be told, this example comes from a Tom Waits song, and not a detailed study of the 
entomological literature. 
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a challenge if claim and counterclaim are to be judged on criteria other than 
opinion. The pragmatic approach suggested in Rohde and Stewart (2008) for 
treating of autonomy simpliciter and followed by Barandarian et al. (2009) is 
to shore up the justification of one or other perspective by the postulation of 
generative mechanisms. In so doing, they seek to go beyond mere description, 
while stopping short of an inflexible essentialism. But the ability to character-
ize a generative mechanism, by itself, does not achieve what the authors seek. 
It is possible to provide algorithmic effective procedures to illustrate many 
kinds of process, but that does nothing to establish the accuracy of the map-
ping from the algorithm to the world. This is a rhetorical strategy that has, in 
the past, lent the domain of artificial intelligence and some varieties of cogni-
tive psychology a veneer of objectivity without due warrant. For example, 
proponents of a very different kind of agenda have sought to justify the crea-
tion of elaborate representational mental models using the same argument: 
The theory should be describable in the form of an effective procedure…If a pro-
cedure can be carried out by a simple machine, plainly it does not require any 
decisions to be made on the basis of intuition or any other such ‘magical’ ingredi-
ent: it is an effective procedure. (Johnson-Laird 1983: 6)  
By avoiding appeal to intuition, or even magic, the resulting theory is cast as 
objective, and hence inherently trustworthy. But the argument does not even 
try to ascertain the appropriateness, viridicality, or utility of the relation that 
obtains between the elements of the theory and the nature of the phenome-
non being studied. So the appeal to generative mechanisms may serve to con-
vince friends, but will hardly convert sceptics. 
An alternative perspective on our strong predilection for attributing agency to 
one system but not another is provided by the claim that life can only be 
known by life. Because we are ourselves beings whose existence is a continual 
striving, we recognize this striving in others. If we were disembodied intel-
lects, no such communion with the living would make sense, and the concepts 
of organism and agency would not have any grounding. Thompson argues: 
To make the link from matter to life and mind, from physics to biology, one needs 
concepts like organism and autopoiesis, but such concepts are available only to 
an embodied mind with firsthand experience of its own living body. (Thompson 
2004: 90) 
This argument has been frequently made, and is sometimes attributed to Hans 
Jonas (1968). It is unclear to me whether both of the concepts of autonomy 
and agency should be considered to be members of the set of concepts that 
can only be understood by an embodied living being. It does not seem to 
stretch credulity too much to assume that tornados and flames might be rec-
ognised as examples of dynamically individuated phenomena to an abstract 
or alien intelligence with the ability to make observations at a human-like 
time and spatial scale. Jonas dismisses their individuality on the grounds of 
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intuition alone (Jonas 1968: 240), but Jonas is not drawing a distinction be-
tween the organisational closure and dynamical persistence that characterises 
autonomous organisation on the one hand, and the striving of an agent exhib-
iting behaviour regulated by goals or norms on the other. 
There is thus a tension in the literature that informs the enactive perspective. 
On the one hand, Maturana (and possibly Varela) insists that: 
Purpose or aims …belong to the domain of our discourse about our actions, that 
is, they belong to the domain of descriptions, and when applied to a machine, or 
any system independent from us, they reflect our considering the machine or 
system in some encompassing context…Accordingly, if living systems are physi-
cal autopoietic machines, teleonomy becomes only an artifice of their description 
which does not reveal any feature of their organization, but which reveals the 
consistency in their operation within the domain of observation. Living systems, 
as physical autopoietic machines, are purposeless systems. (Maturana and Varela 
1991: 85–86)  
On the other, Jonas objects that biological organisms simply are not machines: 
[W]hen we call a living body a “metabolising system,” we must include in the 
term that the system itself is wholly and continuously a result of its metabolising 
activity, and further that none of the “result” ceases to be an object of metabolism 
while it is also an agent of it. For this reason alone, it is inappropriate to liken the 
organism to a machine…food is more than fuel…its role is to build up originally 
and replace continually the very parts of the machine. Metabolism thus is the 
constant becoming of the machine itself—and this becoming itself is a perfor-
mance of the machine: but for such performance there is no analogue in the 
world of machines. (Jonas 1966: 76)  
Given the degree to which Varela leans upon the work of Jonas later (e.g. in 
Weber and Varela 2002), there does not seem to be a fundamental disagree-
ment here, but rather an occasional failure to knowingly distinguish between 
the domain of description, as things appear to an observer who is, herself, an 
agent, and the domain of operation of the system. Recognizing this, it seems to 
me, opens up opportunities to further our understanding of autonomy and 
agency in new ways. 
 
4. Webs of Meaning 
As living entities, we are enmeshed in webs of significance and meaning. The 
tantalising prospect opened up by the enactive approach is to lay the founda-
tion for a rational, scientifically informed account of our goings-on that can 
lean upon such notions as value and meaning, without descending into mere 
relativism and the brandishing of opinions. But this must be done self-
consciously. When we speak of a value, it is with respect to some system for 
which we recognize a degree of autonomy. We can ground such discussion 
through observation of the degree to which a given system exhibits organisa-
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tional closure, by examining the manner in which the system interacts with its 
immediate environment. We can do this to understand the conditions under 
which the autonomous identity exhibited by the system will persist, and the 
conditions under which it will be threatened.  
The construct of the person and the organic reality of the human body need to 
be clearly distinguished here. Some behaviours exhibited by my movements 
make sense when referred to the domain of the body, as, e.g. when I recoil 
from a physical threat, seek water to still my thirst, or sleep. Very many of my 
behaviours do not make sense with respect to the somatic domain alone. 
When I go to a movie, play a tennis match, or vote in an election, these actions 
are structured by value, but the interpretation of the behaviour as subserving 
goals arising from one or other domain is not straightforward. There is no 
guarantee that an activity that can be picked out linguistically ("playing 
a game of tennis") can be interpreted with respect to the values arising from 
any single domain. If the game of tennis is a doubles match, we can recognize 
the domain of my body, the dyadic domain that is my team, and the set of four 
players who together enact the game of tennis. Some features of the activity 
are best understood with respect to each of these three domains, and there are 
probably further domains that one could sensibly identify. Furthermore, both 
the somatic individual, and the dyad that is a team, may admit of agentive 
interpretations, though I see no such interpretation for the set of four players.  
Where an agentive ascription seems appropriate, the language of intentionali-
ty, of goal directedness and striving, can sensibly be applied. The desires, in-
tentions and sensibilities of a group of protesters chanting in unison seem, to 
this author, to be no more or less real than the desires, intentions and sensibil-
ities of me on the tennis court trying to win a match. Intentional predicates 
are easily and naturally used with respect to institutions, nation states, mobs, 
armies, and teams. On a conventional psychological reading, these uses are 
metaphorical extensions of the one true sense grounded in the (Cartesian, 
solipsistic) mind of the cherished individual. But from an enactive perspec-
tive, we can be flexible not only with respect to the identification of domains 
that exhibit temporally extended dynamic identity, but also with respect to 
the implied subject, that provides the values and normative scaffolding that 
allows mere movement to be interpreted as action or behaviour. 
This constitutes something of a reversal of the normal course of scientific in-
quiry. The maxim introduced earlier encourages us to constantly ask both 
what do we see, and what is the implied subject of that seeing. This ground-
lessness is well known within the traditions of Buddhist and Taoist Philoso-
phies, but has only rarely been acknowledged as a valid epistemological 
stance within the domain of science (Varela et al. 1991). In ascribing agency, 
we are tacitly acknowledging a commonality with the system being observed–
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not a commonality based on the human body, but based on the lived experi-
ence of striving that is at the center of the experiencing subject. 
 
5. Disinterest and Empathy 
There is here an opportunity to develop a principled manner in which inten-
tionality and value can be rationally treated within our collective discourse. 
Where the received psychological tradition insists on a single, immovable, 
split between subject and world, we are now in a position to recognize that 
any such split lies within the domain of description of this phenomenon or 
that. As our discourse ranges over the affairs of the body, of the family, of the 
schools and institutions of society, of the relation between man and climate 
systems, and beyond, the ground beneath the discussion shifts, and agency, 
attributed now this way and now that, brings into being first this subject and 
now that. Some of these subjects will appear singular, but some speak of col-
lective intentionality, collective values, values originating with respect to an 
ever-changing topicalised object. 
I bemoaned earlier the casual description of the domain underlying a Parkin-
sonian tremor, first as the body, and then as the person. Neither is the appro-
priate domain to ground the observation of the tremor, but the confusion of 
the body and the person is a far more serious confusion. We can speak with 
a degree of disinterest of the body. For many of us, we can contemplate re-
placing limbs, organs, and the like, with artificial prosthetics, without feeling 
that the person associated with the body is thereby fundamentally changed. 
For when we speak of the person, we speak of the value-laden ground of ex-
perience, of subject-hood. And the subject is neither singular nor plural. Fix-
ing the subject at one level, as conventional psychological theory does, privi-
leges some values over others, introduces a normativity that is utterly at odds 
with the richness and dynamic constitution of our being. 
We can ascribe autonomy in a disinterested fashion, and we should do so. In 
this way we can distinguish between the chimera of the transient and the per-
sistent identity of the autonomous system. When we go further and ascribe 
agency, we take sides, and express a degree of empathy, however slight. In the 
agentive description we acknowledge some relations between a system and its 
milieu as privileged, and accord them value. In dealing with the goings on of 
the animate, we have no choice but to traffic in the values of the animate. 
With life, value leaks in. 
We must, therefore, be careful not to conflate the distinct notions of autonomy 
and agency. Autonomous organisation can be recognised in systems that do 
not display agency, as well as those that do. The ascription of autonomy in the 
sense of organisational closure or dynamic identity is done based on a set of 
criteria that are rooted in our observations. Changing the timescale, spatial 
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scale, or granularity of our observation may lead us to recognize that any as-
cription of autonomy is context-dependent and is done self-consciously by us 
as observers. The ascription of agency goes much further, and leads to the 
recognition of value—not an unprincipled recognition of value, but one 
grounded in system identity. However as observers, we become more firmly 
entwined with the objects of our observation when we engage in discussion of 
norms, goals, and values. These discussions must be done with an even great-
er degree of care. 
There are differing views about the future utility of the enactive perspective. 
In some respects, it does not sit neatly within the contingent administrative 
divisions that characterize our institutions of learning and research. It is not 
psychology, nor is it merely social science, nor biology, and heaven forfend, it 
should not be mere philosophy. There are very many issues that are well ad-
dressed within the conventional frameworks, and for those there is no urgen-
cy in insisting upon an alternative approach. A cardiologist dealing with an 
acute heart attack does not need to ponder whether the function of the heart 
is better referred to the domain of the body or the domain of the description 
of the body, or just what the domain of the subject here is. The rehabilitation 
worker who needs to address the difficult re-integration of the post-heart-
attack patient into the overlapping and competing spheres of family and oc-
cupational life, on the other hand, might have need of some principles to 
guide that complex task. 
The advantage to be gained from adopting a fundamentally new perspective is 
that questions may now be posed, and perhaps addressed, that lie beyond our 
present competences. It is therefore to be hoped that the careful curation of 
the enactive vocabulary may help us to untie the conceptual knots that arise 
from a sterile and immovable split between mind and world. Here the ill-
structured theoretical quagmire of mental health appears as an obvious do-
main of potential application. But so too do numerous societal issues that bear 
upon the relation of the individual to the many forms of collectivities that 
together make up our lives. Thinking further ahead, the collective that is hu-
manity will inevitably face major issues for which it is ill-prepared, and that 
demand working solutions couched in a vocabulary of a collective that is nei-
ther imposed nor fictitious. The “we" will be negotiated, and that is only pos-
sible if we are capable of an ontological light touch in the matter of the (many) 
subject(s). 
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